Substantial evidence in both comparative and U.S. politics indicates that electoral structures can have a significant impact on descriptive representation. Descriptive representation is symbolic, however, unless representatives actively pursue the interests of their constituents.
representative to obtain particular individual or group benefits for the represented. Allocation responsiveness refers to the representative's ability to secure policy benefits for the represented through pork barrel exchanges. Finally, symbolic responsiveness refers to public gestures that develop a sense of trust and support between the representative and the represented.
All of these components can be considered substantive representation, that is, representing the interests of the representative's constituents. For this study we operationally define substantive representation as the ability of an African-American school board representative to both attain allocation responsiveness (the ability to hire additional black employees, for similar operational definitions of representation see among others Eisinger1980; Sass and Mehay 2003; Karnig 1980; Kerr and Mladenka 1994; Mladenka 1989 ) and policy responsiveness (the ability to generate policy benefits for black constituents). These two forms of representation are not independent of each other; black school board members can set general policies that create opportunities to black students by expanding quality academic opportunities or limiting the application of discipline. Much of the representational impact of school board members, however, is likely to be indirect through the actions of black administrators and teachers.
African-American administrators play two distinct roles in the policy responsiveness of representation. First, they have an indirect role through their strong association with hiring African-American teachers. Second, they can adopt policies that can be applied either school wide or district wide in terms of grouping, tracking, discipline or other factors (see Pitts 2005; Roch, Pitts and Navarro 2010) .
Much literature documents a variety of ways that black teachers can benefit black students. First, African American teachers are associated with positive academic grouping outcomes -fewer black students assigned to special education, vocational and other low status groups and more black students assigned to gifted and talented classes (Foster 1997; Meier et al. 1989; Ogbu 1994) . Black teachers are also associated with more equitable disciplinary actions in regard to black students (Meier et al. 1989) . Second, although much literature contends that African-American teachers are better at teaching African-American students (Clewell and Villegas 1998; Denbo 2002; King 1993) , the empirical results were fairly mixed until the Tennessee STAR experiment. The STAR experiment randomly assigned students to classes ostensibly to examine the impact of class size on student performance. Dee (2001; took advantage of this random assignment design to study the impact of African-American teachers on African-American students and concluded that African-American students learned significantly more from same race teachers than they did from white teachers. Third, African-American teachers and administrators might not take any specific actions but simply serve as role models to African-American students (King 1993, 121) . Dee (2001, 5) notes "for under privileged black students, the presence of a black teacher may encourage them to update their prior beliefs about their educational possibilities." Whether via role models or different teaching techniques, however, higher minority student educational performance is consistently associated with the presence of minority teachers (Meier et al. 2001) .
Electoral Systems and African American Representation
Electoral systems can take many forms. In the U.S. most elections are either at-large elections whereby all representatives are elected by the entire jurisdiction and ward or singlemember district elections where candidates run for a single seat in smaller electoral units. The analysis and debate has focused on local governments -city councils and school boards -simply because Congress and, for the most part, state legislatures use single member districts.
The logic supporting ward/single member districts as producing more descriptive representation for minorities assumes that electorates are polarized along racial lines (that is, that race is a significant electoral cleavage) and that the single member districts are drawn in such a way that they are not microcosms of the overall jurisdiction (either as a result of residential segregation or perhaps because they are gerrymandered to facilitate racial representation). In such circumstances, blacks (and other numerical minorities) are likely to achieve greater descriptive representation in single member district systems than in at-large systems because they can run in smaller, more homogeneous districts with larger black (or other numerical minority) populations. The empirical literature, while not always in agreement, generally illustrates the detrimental impact of at-large elections (see Shah et al. 2013; Meier and Rutherford 2014 and the work cited therein).
Although descriptive representation is important for understanding representation, an equally pressing issue is how electoral structure (at-large versus single member districts) can affect black substantive representation. Is a black representative elected at-large more or less effective in representing the interests of the black community than a representative elected from a single member district? Several scholars (Guinier 1991; Sass and Mehay 2003; Swain 1993) argue for the advantages of at-large elections by stressing that at-large elections facilitate the creation of multiracial governing coalitions. Guinier (1991 Guinier ( , 1111 suggests "constituents within isolated single-member districts have little influence over the behavior of representatives from other single-member districts." The argument is that the system of at-large elections is more beneficial because African-American officeholders can augment their influence by building coalitions with other non-African-American elected officials who represent the same electoral constituency (and thus face the same electoral incentives). This argument parallels an earlier argument by Browning, Marshall and Tabb (1984) that minorities need to form coalitions with liberal whites to gain policy benefits (but see Marschall, Shah, and Ruhil 2010) . With help from their friends (allies), minorities can achieve their representational goals.
The idea of coalition building between African-American representatives and non-black officials in at-large systems, however, may have an Achilles heel. In at-large systems black representatives may need to downplay issues important to the minority community in an attempt to appeal to the median voter and win elections (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Meier et al. 2005 ). This can be problematic because it implies that the representative will sacrifice responsiveness to the black community by adopting issue positions at the median voter for all constituents rather than issue positions at the median voter for black constituents.
Others argue that the structure of ward elections is the most beneficial system for minority representatives to act substantively (see Lublin 1999; Meier et al. 2005; Leal et al. 2004) . A ward electoral system permits candidates to win by securing a majority of the votes cast within a much smaller area with more racial homogeneity than that of an at-large system. This system is more advantageous for black representatives, the argument suggests, because it is easier for them to acquire seats and then advocate policies that represent the interest of the black community. Lublin (1999) , in his critique of Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran (1996) , contends that single member districts are vital to blacks being elected into office and that these districts bolster the quality of candidates elected.
The empirical evidence on structure and substantive representation has been modest. In the most direct study linking descriptive representation and electoral structure to substantive representation, Sass and Mehay (2003) analyze whether or not black city council members have greater policy influence in jurisdictions that use at-large elections rather than ward election systems. They test this proposition by estimating the hiring of municipal police officers. The results show that cities with an at-large electoral system hire a "substantially greater proportion of black police officers" (Sass and Mehay 2003, 334) . 1 These findings suggest one of two possibilities. The first possibility is that black representatives elected in an at-large system have a significant amount of influence over policy decisions. The other possibility suggests that perhaps white representatives are responsive to the interests of the black community when elected at-large.
In contrast, one other study has found that representatives elected via single member districts generate more benefits for minority constituents. Although a series of studies of urban school districts have linked minority hiring to representation systems (Leal et al. 2004; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991; Robinson et al. 1985) , none of these studies examines whether at-large or ward representatives are more effective. They simply relate the descriptive legislative representation to bureaucratic representation rather than distinguish among the effectiveness of representatives elected in various systems. Only one previous school board study examines this question. Meier et al. (2005) examined 1000+ Texas school districts to find that minority school board members elected in an at-large system were less effective in securing 1 Sass and Mehay specify electoral structure with a dummy variable rather than as an interaction. This specification means that electoral structure should have the same impact on representation whether the group has zero representation or 20, 35, or 60% representation. policy benefits than representatives elected from single member districts. That study is limited, however, by its focus on a single state and its cross-sectional analysis. Thus, there remains uncertainty in how different electoral systems have affected representation and, more importantly, neither study addressed policy representation directly.
A Theory of Political Structure and Substantive Representation
The literature on substantive minority representation has offered a variety of viewpoints that, at times, provide conflicting implications. By empirically analyzing black substantive outcomes in the educational sphere, we shed light on a portion of the debate regarding how and when representation matters. The two systems we study, at-large and single member districts, can be reviewed through formal logic to illustrate how electoral structure is linked to representational effectiveness. This section gives a brief overview of the two systems considered here and generates a set of testable hypotheses, each of which we test with school district data. The basic logic is that of structure plus, though structure by itself does not matter as much as structure interacting with other contextual factors fully determine which terms have a meaningful effect on substantive representation.
First we must consider why a black candidate elected in an at-large system might be less (or more) effective at pursuing black interests than one elected from a single member district.
Following Meier, Juenke, Wrinkle, and Polinard (2005) , we begin with the following assumptions: Assumption 1. Rational voters will vote for candidates most likely to represent their interests.
Assumption 2. Rational candidates will seek to satisfy constituency interests (either strictly for reelection or to pursue policy goals). Assumption 3. Race is an important political issue (that is, political preferences differ based on race), but blacks do not compose a majority of the electorate.
For example, consider a district where the large majority of voters are white so that the median voter is highly likely to also be white. These voters will tend to elect someone who represents their interests (assumption one) which, if the electorate is polarized by race, likely do not include issues most central to black voters (assumption three). In order for a black candidate to successfully win an election, he or she must craft a campaign targeted at the non-minority median voter (assumption two). In some cases, this may lead to the downplaying or outright rejection of positions supported by black voters. Once in office, if the black candidate shifts his or her focus from the expressed campaign positions to those that match more closely with black constituents, he or she can alienate the median voter and risks losing office in the next election.
The problems associated with moving to the median voter position in an at-large system mean that minority candidates should fare better quantitatively in single member district systems that are likely to have one or more districts with a black majority. In terms of substantive representation, however, Guinier (1991) , Sass and Mehay (2003) and Swain (1993) argue that having minority candidates run and win in at-large elections improves eventual policy outcomes by increasing the likelihood that black elected officials will find coalition partners with white elected officials because they represent similar constituencies.
To illustrate precisely the differences in electoral systems and why conflicting hypotheses are generated, let us assume that the utility (U) gained via representation is the sum of the values (V) sought by the representative times the probability (P) of attaining the values.
U = G PV
The advocates of ward elections are essentially arguing that the values (V) of at-large based representatives are different (e.g., they are less relevant to the minority community) from those of representatives from single member districts owing to the necessity of getting elected (i.e., positioning at the median voter). At-large advocates challenge this view by noting that the descriptive representatives are still a numerical minority so that non-minority representatives can still veto any pro-minority policies (i.e., that the value of P is close to zero).
To support the cause of at-large elections, the advocates contend that the probability (P) of achieving any values after election increases in at-large systems owing to the common constituencies and the potential for coalition partners. The ward advocates counter that the atlarge minority representatives will hold values distinctly different from the values of their minority constituents so that any representational success will not be as closely linked to constituent values. In short, whether ward or at-large elections generate better substantive representation depends on whether the change in values (V) is greater or less than the change in the probability (P) of attaining the values. Both sides use the same assumptions and the same utility calculus but emphasize different parts of the equation. The two contradictory hypotheses, therefore, are the result of stressing either changes in values (wards) or changes in the probability of attaining these values (at-large). Substantive minority representation, as a result, can be greater (or smaller) in ward-based single member district systems than will the substantive representation in at-large systems depending on the relative change of values versus the relative change in probabilities. Our hypotheses can be stated as:
H 1 [The Ward Hypothesis] Minority representatives in ward-based single member district systems will be more likely to share the policy values of minority constituents; they will thus be more effective representing minority interests than will minority representatives in at-large systems, all other things being equal.
H 2 [The At-large Hypothesis] Minority representatives in at-large systems will find it easier to craft majority coalitions and will thus be more effective in representing minority interests than will minority representatives in ward systems, all other things being equal.
Generalizing the above arguments further, the at-large hypothesis is essentially about the ability to gain support from like minded individuals. Such allies might be generated with processes other than at-large elections. The argument for single member districts and descriptive representation relies on the assumption of racial polarization. If one relaxes the assumption of racial polarization, it means that some other political cleavage will be the determinant of election outcomes. Partisanship or ideology are likely candidates. Because the voting patterns for African Americans are so heavily Democratic, having white Democrats either as constituents or as fellow elected officials should also be a way to increase the probability of attaining any representational values in the absence of racial polarization. 2 This logic suggest that the at-large hypothesis might be a special case of a more general hypothesis: H3 [The Allies Hypothesis] Minority representatives in any electoral system will find it easier to craft coalitions when they have supportive allies. In jurisdictions with Democratic voting majorities, minority representatives will be more successful in representing minority interests.
While theoretical literature exists to support each of the hypotheses above, empirical findings to date provide a less promising picture. Given the substantial number of studies at the national and state levels that generate null results on the linkage between descriptive and substantive representation (Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran 1996; Swain 1995; but see Preuhs 2006; Owens 2005; and Hicklin and Meier 2008 ), why might one expect different findings at the local level, or in this case, why might a minority representative who is not likely to be part of the majority on the school board still influence school board decisions? One possibility is that the size of local units generates different politics than that in a much larger legislature. A single minority elected to a five person school board has a much greater chance of becoming the pivotal member on a vote than does a minority (or even 20 minorities) elected to a 435 person legislature. Large legislatures also have extensive rules and structures that limit what individual members can do. In a school board, small group dynamics will likely create different types of relationships and more opportunities for log rolling.
Data
Four data bases were merged to conduct this study. First, three original surveys generated data on school board representation, administrators, and teachers in 2001, 2004 and 2008 for all school districts with student populations over 5000. Of the 5,493 district years, the response rates were 94.5% for school board composition and 83.7% for administrators and teachers. 3 Second, demographic and socioeconomic information were collected from the 2000 U.S. Census school district files; school districts are not conterminous with cities or other jurisdictions which requires the use of special census files. Third, the partisan distribution of school districts were estimated using data on elections returns for 2004 and 2008 presidential elections (see below).
Fourth, data on student discipline and access to gifted classes are taken from the periodic surveys of the U.S. Office for Civil Rights (OCR). Because some census data are coded as missing and OCR does not survey all districts every year, 4 the actual number of cases will vary depending on the model and its specification. The panel nature of the data set creates potential problems with nonspherical errors. All models are estimated with fixed effects for the individual years to deal with any trends over time, and standard errors are clustered by school district. 5
This study examines both allocative representation and policy representation. The two measures of allocative responsiveness are the percentage of African-American administrators and the percentage of African-American teachers in the school district. The process of hiring administrators and teachers varies enough so that it is quite possible that descriptive representation might affect one but not the other. Hiring teachers is generally more constrained with elaborate certification requirements imposed at the state level. Although there are alternative certification processes, these also have education requirements and include additional post-hiring training. The implementation of quality teacher standards under No Child Left Behind has also placed a high premium on certified teachers. Administrators, particularly central office administrators, can be drawn from a range of professions, and thus, allow more flexibility in hiring. 6 The empirical evidence suggests hiring more African-American administrators is easier than hiring African-American teachers. In our sample, African-Americans achieve 98% of the administrative representation their population would predict but only 73% of the teacher representation. 7 Specific hypotheses distinguishing between teachers and administrators are ambiguous; because hiring administrators is subject to fewer rules, one might expect that descriptive representation would have a stronger impact on administrators than teachers. Meier at al. (1989) found school board representation influenced the hiring of black administrators but only indirectly affected the hiring of black teachers (by increasing the number of black administrators; there were no direct effects). The logic of more committed values and greater allies, on the other hand, are likely to be more valuable as processes get more difficult suggesting that structure might have a greater influence on the hiring of teachers.
African American representation at the bureaucratic level is not just allocative and symbolic but generates substantively beneficial outcomes for minority students. Two measures of substantive policy representation will be used -the percentage of black students who get access to gifted classes and the percentage of black students who are suspended from school.
Gifted classes are considered the best education that a school system provides, and access to such classes by African Americans is a long standing policy goal (Ford et al. 2001) . Similarly the unequal application of disciplinary policy is frequently a highly salient issue in the black community (Townsend 2000, Fenning and Rose 2007) . Out of school suspensions are correlated with school dropouts and negatively correlated with high school graduation rates. By using both a measure of tracking and discipline, findings should provide some indication of whether representation and structure have direct or indirect on educational opportunities for students.
The strongest representational influence on gifted classes and suspensions should be bureaucratic representation. This is especially true for teachers since they interact with students most frequently and can recommend students for gifted placements or for discipline.
Administrators are less likely to have direct student interaction and, given that discipline is dispensed by administrators, there are organizational pressures for administrators to be strong disciplinarians. School board members are the most distant from the policy measures so that their direct impact (as opposed to their indirect effect through the hiring administrators and teachers) is likely to be the smallest although they can influence overall policies such as the size of gifted classes or the types of disciplinary policy (zero tolerance, corporal punishment) used in the district.
Modeling Substantive Representation
An extensive literature in U.S. politics uses the hiring of bureaucratic employees as a measure of the allocative dimension of substantive representation. Hiring public employees, however, is not an unconstrained task as it might have been during the patronage era but is subject to merit system rules and a variety of other constraints. The dominant determinant of minority hiring or any public employment position is the composition and qualifications of the labor pool. To that factor, we add variables measuring the political context and representation as it interacts with electoral structure. Parallel models for policy actions will include all of these factors plus the representation of black administrators and black teachers.
Representation and Structure
The theoretical argument linking descriptive representation as modified by structure to substantive representation requires an interaction between electoral structure and representation.
African-American representation on the school board is measured as the percentage of school board members who are African American. School boards in the U.S. use three types of selection plans -at-large elections where all individuals are elected by the entire jurisdiction (59% of cases in this analysis), single member district elections where individuals run within smaller wards with one representative per ward (29%), and appointed systems where the school board is appointed by another elected official (3%). 8 The remaining school districts (9%) use a combination of these methods, the most common of which is electing some members at-large and some in single member districts. Most elections, regardless of structure, are organized as nonpartisan elections (in other words, candidates to not explicitly identify with a political party).
The electoral system variable will be operationalized as the proportion of members elected by single member districts and the proportion appointed (with those elected at-large as the excluded category) to retain the mixed systems in the analysis. These two variables will be interacted with the percentage of African-American school board members so as to permit comparing the effectiveness of representatives elected in pure at-large with those elected by pure single member district systems or appointed (see Engstrom and McDonald 1982; Meier et al. 2005) .
Labor Pool Factors
The primary labor pool characteristic is the size of the minority population. This factor, operationalized as the percentage of the population in the school district that is black, is consistently the strongest predictor of minority employment in the bureaucracy (Eisinger 1980; Mladenka 1989; Meier, O'Toole and Nicholson Crotty 2003; Sass and Mehay 2003) . U.S. education systems have elaborate certification processes for teachers and, to a lessor extent, educational administrators. Alternative certification processes have created some additional avenues to teaching positions, but a college degree is essentially required for teaching positions and virtually required for administrative ones; the qualifications measure is the percentage of black population aged 25+ with a college degree. The attractiveness of teaching position is also likely a function of the relative benefits of teaching versus alternative jobs and this can be tapped by some economic factors. Models of teachers and administrators have used a measure of median black income to indicate the relative attractiveness of a teaching salary, a measure of black home ownership to indicate minority commitment to the community (Baretto, Marks and Woods 2007) , and a measure of white poverty to indicate the percentage of whites that may have a similar socioeconomic status to minority populations in the community. The labor pool characteristics should be considered controls to make sure the models are not underspecified and will not be given a great deal of attention in this analysis.
The Political Context
The political context contains a set of factors that could facilitate or limit the ability of African-American representatives to be engaged in allocative responsiveness -partisanship, unionization, and region. Democratic partisanship is likely to enhance the ability to hire additional minority teachers and administrators by providing the political support for affirmative action policies. Liberal whites are viewed as a natural political ally of African Americans (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1984; Sigelman et al. 1995; Hajnal 2001) and are likely to share policy values with African Americans. We calculated the Democratic percentage variable by taking presidential election returns for 2004 and 2008 at the county level (the closest level of aggregation to school districts) and regressing these percentages on a set of demographic variables including race, income, and education for all counties in the United States. We use the regression coefficients to then adjust the Democratic percentages for the county where the school district is located to get an estimated school district Democratic percentage. 9 Harris County Texas (Houston) has several school districts and provides an good illustration. Harris County has a Democratic percentage of 47.8 but the school districts range from strongly Democratic (61.4% in North Forest Independent School District) 10 to strongly Republican (36.3% Democratic in the Channelview Independent School District).
Unions have long played a role in the politics of urban school districts (Katznelson 1981;
Moe 2009). Although much attention has been paid to the role of teachers unions in school board electoral politics, they can also influence hiring practices given their ability to negotiate for and engage in the protection of union members. Unions should essentially slow down the personnel process and make rapid changes in personnel less likely. Given the historical 9 As an illustration, the county regressions show that a one percentage increase in black population is associated with a .39 percentage point increase in Democratic vote. If a school district had 10 percentage points more black population than the county that school district was located in, we adjusted the district Democratic percentage upward by 3.9 percentage points. 10 North Forrest School District was taken over by the state of Texas in 2013 and merged into the Houston Independent School District. discrimination in hiring, this could result in a negative relationship with minority hiring. Ideally, this study would use membership in the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) or the National Education Association. Neither organization provides school district level membership, and one does not even provide state level membership. As a surrogate we use the percentage of the workforce that was unionized in each state. This assumes that the presence of unions within a state are correlated with the level of teacher unionization and thus that teachers are more likely to be unionized.
Finally, a district can only hire African-American teachers and administrators if there are qualified individuals, generally graduates of schools of education. School districts in the South have an advantage in this regard for two reasons. First, by operating a segregated school system for many years, Southern districts created a demand for African-American teachers for their segregated schools. Second, to meet this demand, many of the Historically Black Colleges and Universities had strong teaching programs that continue to produce large numbers of teachers today. We classified a district as Southern if it was located in a state that operated a de jure segregated school system in 1954 when the Supreme Court declared such systems unconstitutional for the first time. 11
The Quality of Black Representation Table 1 examines the impact of African-American school board members on the hiring of 11 This creates a larger number of Southern states than does the 11 states of the old Confederacy rule. The grouping also includes border states such as Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, and Oklahoma, as well as states such as Maryland and Delaware. If region is to represent the unique political and educational history of the South, the classification needs to include states that had policies consistent with that political history. Using the traditional definition of South produced identical results.
African-American administrators and teachers. For African-American administrators, population size, a basic labor pool characteristic, is the predominant predictor. 12 This makes imminent sense in that one cannot generate bureaucratic representation if there is no population to represent.
Given the interaction of structure with representation, the zero-order coefficient for African-American representation is interpreted as the impact of representation in at-large systems because the ward and appointed terms are equal to zero as are the interaction terms (controlling for all Although these equations suggest that representatives elected in single member districts or appointed are slightly more effective than those elected at-large, the interaction coefficients are not statistically different from zero. 13 The appropriate conclusion is that a one percentage point increase in African-American representatives is associated a .13 percentage point increase in African-American administrators, and that how the representatives are elected has no impact on their allocative effectiveness. Several of the control variables are significant predictors with 12 Nonlinear tests for both the black population and black board members proved insignificant. 13 The intercept terms are meaningful only if all other variables are set at zero which is well outside the range of the data. The change-in-intercept terms, however, are meaningful since they indicate the difference in levels across the selection systems.
administrative representation positively associated with Democratic partisanship, and Southern region and negatively associated with white poverty and unionization.
[ Table 1 About Here]
The second column of Table 1 presents In at-large systems, school board representation is not associated with more African-American teachers; it is significantly and negatively related although the impact is relatively small (a ten percentage point increase is representation is associated with less than a half percentage point decline in teachers). Representatives elected in single member districts as well as appointed representatives have a positive impact (the coefficients are statistically distinct from both the atlarge coefficient and from zero). In both cases a ten percentage point increase in African American representation is associated with a one percentage point increase in teacher representation. Given the elaborate merit system procedures for hiring teachers, this impact should be considered substantively significant.
Examining the individual change coefficients reveals that in both cases the intercept for single member districts and appointed representatives becomes more negative. For the single member district representatives, the negative drop in intercept is compensated by the increase in slope when representation is greater than 4%; given the relative size of school boards (96.5%
have nine or fewer members), this indicates that any representation at all in a ward system generates positive results. For appointed systems, the threshold is 15% representation which suggests that a single person on an appointed school board is likely to have little impact and a critical mass could well be needed. Teacher representation is also positively associated with black education levels, Democratic partisans, white poverty and Southern region and is negatively associated with union strength.
These results should not be taken to imply that representatives elected at-large are completely ineffective in gaining allocational representation at the street level, only that they have no direct impact. Similar to representatives elected through ward structures or who are appointed, representatives in at-large districts still have an indirect impact on the teaching population indirectly through their influence on the hiring of African-American administrators (column 1) who in turn are associated with more African-American teachers (column 2).
The results thus far support the first hypothesis and reject the second; African Americans elected in single member districts are associated with better allocational representation than are at-large members. These findings are consistent with the logic that the change in values is more important than the change in probability associated with coalition partners. These results, however, could be influenced by the small set of school districts where African Americans are a majority of the population which renders the coalitional argument moot. To investigate further, Table 2 presents the determinants of African-American administrators and teachers only for those districts where African Americans are less than 50% of the population. The results of Table 2 replicate those in Tables 1. The exception is in the administrative equation where the change in intercept term for single member districts is now positive and statistically significant. The impact is modest at best with an additional 0.56% African American administrators in districts where the school board is elected in single member districts (the slopes do not change from one system to the other). The representational effectiveness of appointed African-American school board members also increases to .264 from .159, a statistically significant impact at the 0.10 level. That appointed board members appear more effective in jurisdictions where African
Americans are a minority likely reflects the coalition composition of the appointing politicians.
The second equation in Table 2 for teacher representation shows results that are highly consistent with Table 1 , again indicating that African-American representatives elected from single member districts are associated with higher levels of allocative representation compared to those elected at-large.
[ Table 2 About Here]
The importance of allocative representation should not be underestimated. Table 3 shows the determinants of assignments to gifted classes and out of school suspensions for African American students. These models include all the determinants of allocative responsiveness plus the percentage of black teachers and administrator. The two strongest influences on African American gifted class assignments are the percentage of black students and the percentage of black teachers. A one percentage point increase in black teachers is associated with an increase of about one-fourth of one percent increase in gifted class assignments. School board representation is statistically significant in this model (this should be interpreted as the impact of at-large elected board members) but the impact is very small (a ten percent increase in board representation is associated with only a 0.59 percent increase is black gifted class assignments).
The ward structure coefficients are not statistically significant, which means that at-large versus ward representation plays no direct role in gifted class assignments (though it does play an indirect role through the hiring of administrators and teachers). For the first time, the appointive system coefficients are both statistically significant as a negative intercept change and a positive slope change. In combination, these coefficients indicate that representation has a positive impact on gifted class assignments when representation exceeds 20.3% of the board. Gifted class assignments are also positively associated with black education levels, white poverty, Democratic voters, and unionization and negatively associated with Southern region, all consistent with theoretical predictions.
[ Table 3 About Here]
The second column of Table 3 shows To further clarify the role of partisanship in the representation process, Table 4 presents 14 The positive coefficient for black administrators likely reflects the incentives that administrators have to increase discipline to create reputations that will enhance future promotion chances. The much larger relative size of the teacher coefficient indicates that this administrator impact is cancelled out at low levels of teacher representation. 15 For the role that white liberals play in elected school board members see Meier and Rutherford (2014) .
the administrative and teacher equations for districts with a Democratic majority and for districts with a Republican majority. At the administrative level, structure appears to matter very little;
the interaction coefficients are statistically insignificant for both Republican and Democratic jurisdictions. One modest difference is that the effectiveness of African-American representatives in general appears to be higher in Democratic jurisdictions (.146) than in Republican ones (.101) although the two coefficients are not statistically different from each other. This lack of significance, however, is a function of including those districts with African American population majorities. When the analysis is limited to those district where African Americans are less than half of the population (see appendix [ Table 4 About Here]
The teacher regressions in Table 3 show the impact of the combination of electoral structure and partisanship. African-American representatives in at-large systems are not associated with any increase in African-American teachers regardless of which party is the majority. In both cases only representatives in either single member district systems or appointive systems are associated with gains in allocative representation. For the single member district systems, the impact of partisanship is readily apparent. The size of the representation coefficient is three times larger in Democratic jurisdictions than it is in Republican ones, and the difference is statistically significant (the relationship is unaffected by whether or not African
Americans are a majority of the population or not; see appendix Table 2 ).
The best of all possible worlds in allocative representation is to achieve a voting majority in the legislature. Two percent of district years in our analysis have a school board with an African-American majority. Table 5 replicates the results of the teacher model in Table 1 but includes an interaction between African-American representation and a dummy variable for the cases where African Americans control the school board. 16 Model 1 includes all districts in our sample, and Model 2 includes only districts where African-Americans are a minority population.
The marginal effects for the various combinations of electoral structure and majorities on the board reveals the following:
At-large minority -.078
At-large majority +.143
Single Member District minority +.061
Single Member District majority +.282
Appointed minority +.019
Appointed majority +.240
All marginal effects are statistically significant except for the appointive-minority case.
Although the best possible cases for representation occur when there is a voting majority on the school board, this is an obvious and perhaps trivial case (but see the extensive literature on black mayors and city council majorities- Keller 1998 , Eisinger 1982 , Gerber and Hopkins 2011 . The results clearly show how the values portion of the utility calculus dominates the relationship between representation and allocative responsiveness. Single member district systems 16 The large negative intercept shift with majority black districts can be ignored since it is more than compensated for the fifty percent figure for black representatives. The actual intercept shift at a voting majority is approximately a 3.5% increase in African American teachers. consistently produce better representation; this representational effectiveness is further enhanced when the jurisdiction has a Democratic majority. Appointive systems also have a positive interaction coefficient which is slightly larger than the ward coefficient in Republican majority jurisdictions and slightly smaller in Democratic ones.
The differences in the teachers and the administrators equation in terms of representational influence might reflect a greater degree of difficulty in influencing the appointment of teachers. The school board hires the top administrator and thus can directly determine the race of this one individual. Individual administrators (e.g., the principal of a high school in a black part of the city) can be highly visible and the target of top-down political influence. The selection of teachers, in contrast, is heavily restricted by state licensing requirements, merit system procedures, and the influence of teachers unions. Clearly the ability to influence the composition of teachers will take more effort in a sustained manner than will the composition of administrators. In such a case, the change in values of the representatives (read ward elections) and the ability to put together a coalition on the school board (via a Democratic majority) might both be necessary. If this is true, ward-based representatives would be more effective at gaining more black teachers regardless of the electoral system and most effective in conjunction with a Democratic majority -exactly the pattern that was found in this study.
[ Table 5 About Here]
The influence of partisanship on allocative responsiveness suggests that the link between partisanship and policy responsiveness is also worth examining. [ Table 6 About Here]
The representation pattern for black school suspensions has some commonalities with that for gifted classes but also some clear differences. School board representation only has a direct effect in Republican jurisdictions, however, the impact is positive not negative. More school board representatives in Republican districts are associated with more suspensions of black students. The negative coefficient for ward representatives is about the same size as the positive at-large coefficient indicating that the ward representation coefficient is essentially zero (there is no direct impact). In both cases bureaucratic representation is the key. A one percentage point increase in black teachers is associated with a .25 percentage point reduction in black suspensions in Republican districts and a .77 percentage point reduction in Democratic districts. The two coefficients are statistically different from each other. In short, bureaucratic representation on this policy indicator is significantly more effective in Democratic jurisdictions.
Conclusion
Research since the passage of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) has focused largely on the differences in representation in at-large and single member district/ward electoral systems.
While this extensive research has been useful in understanding the role of electoral structures for representation, it has often overlooked whether minority representatives, once elected, are able to secure policy benefits for the minority group they represent. This study finds that, in the context of local school districts, electoral structure matters little for increasing representation among school administrators but that single member district systems consistently produce better representation among teachers. School board members whether elected at-large or in single member districts have little direct impact on either access to gifted classes or the suspension of black students (without considering the interaction of partisanship); they do have strong indirect policy impacts, however, through their influence on the racial composition of administrators and teachers. Beyond the effect of electoral structure, this study is among the first to consider the role of partisanship in the translation of descriptive to substantive representation. Findings in this study shows that the allocative effectiveness of representation is further enhanced when the school district has a Democratic majority, despite the partisan face-neutrality of school board elections. Similarly, the partisan majority of the district directly affects both the equity of policy actions and the role that representation can play in determining these outcomes. In other words, partisan politics matters even where elections and related environmental contexts are intended to be nonpartisan.
That single member districts produce black representatives who provide greater policy benefits for black constituents supports the argument that the values of single member district representatives are better able to align with their constituents than those of at-large representatives who may shift their values to align more closely to the median (likely white) voter. Thus, even in the case where at-large elections prove more useful in electing black representatives, these individuals may be more symbolic and have little ability to affect policy formation processes. Black representatives' ability to encourage policies that benefit black populations may rely more on finding allies among other minorities or with liberal majority groups.
That partisanship matters for achieving representation and policy benefits is perhaps not surprising but can not be understated at the local level. Even in elections that are labeled as nonpartisan (87% of the districts in this study use nonpartisan elections), higher levels of Democratic voters are able to foster both representation and policy benefits for minorities. This is likely to produce further indirect and direct benefits for lessening the education gap between student majority and minority groups. Additional research linking representation to student achievement and educational equity can shed additional light on the influence of partisanship and electoral structure in education policy.
In sum, electoral structure and partisanship continue to matter despite recent doubts related to the function and purpose of policies such as the Voting Right Act. Relationships detected in this study may also be generalizable to other local policy areas such as health, welfare, and public safety. 
